Reflecting on the legacy of the late Richard Rorty, Norm points out that there's no necessary connection between philosophical and political commitments. In Rorty's case, it's entirely contingent that his (broadly anti-foundationalist) philosophical views should have lined up with his social democratic or liberal politics. After all, Norm argues, it's possible to base a secular, liberal political morality identical to the one Rorty espoused on a conception of permanent human needs of the kind he rejected.
In fact, the problem goes deeper, as Norm knows very well. John Holbo puts his finger on it in a post at Crooked Timber:
The real problem is that Rorty’s torn between a ‘Pyrhhonist’ ... anti-foundational epistemology and a progressive politics, in which he would like to demand lots of social changes, for the sake of social justice. His reformist reach exceeds his justificatory good conscience. He really thinks he’s right, but doesn’t think he can give his opponents rational grounds that they are compelled to accept.
In other words, Rorty's philosophical views prevent him from justifying or defending his progressive politics – and that's politically problematic. So it's not just that political liberalism needn't line up with philosophical pragmatism or anti-foundationalism: if our fundamental liberal values don't rest on certain substantive moral commitments – if, in other words, we're prohibited from regarding those values as true – then are they really values at all?